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CALIFORNIA'S PRIVATE STOP NOTICE LAW:
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Recent decisions of both the United States1 and California2 Su-
preme Courts have invalidated statutes permitting prejudgment seizure
of debtors' property without notice or hearing. These holdings estab-
lish the principle that procedural due process requires both notice and
a hearing before a creditor may deprive a person of his property un-
less extraordinary cirumstances make it impossible for those safeguards
to be afforded. The practical result of this increased procedural pro-
tection has been to reduce drastically the scope of the weapons avail-
able for creditors to use against debtors. 3
Subcontractors, materialmen, suppliers and laborers need a method
of enforcing claims for work which they have performed on construc-
tion projects. The mechanics' lien is their traditional remedy; it allows
a claimant who prevails at trial to compel the sale of the land and
the improvement built on it and to recover the amount of his claim
from the proceeds.4
The right to a mechanics' lien is embodied in the California Con-
stitution," but there are two main limitations on its effectiveness.
First, a mechanics' lien may be barred by foreclosure of a mortgage
or deed of trust which is recorded prior to the mechanics' lien. 6 This
1. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969).
2. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d
1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125,
83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83
Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
3. See cases cited in note 133 infra. The courts have made it clear that they
do not wish to destroy creditors' remedies. They merely require that historical reme-
dies such as attachment and replevin be applied with minimum procedural safeguards.
"We do not question the power of a State to seize goods before a final judgment in
order to protect the security interests of creditors so long as those creditors have tested
their claim to the goods through the process of a fair prior hearing... . []t is axio-
matic that the hearing must provide a real test." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-
97 (1972).
4. CAL. CIrv. CoDE §§ 3109-3153 (West Supp. 1974). The mechanics' lien is
defined as "A claim created by law for the purpose of securing priority of payment
of the price or value of work performed and materials furnished in erecting or repairing
a building or other structure, and as such attaches to the land as well as buildings and
improvements erected thereon." BLAciK's LAw DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
5. CAL. CoNsr., art. 20, § 15.
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3134 (West Supp. 1974).
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may occur when, for example, a subdivider borrows money to buy land
and to finance the construction of homes he will build on it. The sub-
divider gives a mortgage to the lender for the land and the homes
as they are built in order to secure the loan. The lender records the
mortgage at the office of the county recorder. If the subdivider de-
faults on the loan payments, the lender may foreclose his mortgage
and thus cut off the right of mechanics' lien claimants to subject the
property to forced sale.
The second limitation is that mechanics' liens may not be used
against public works projects. 7 The reluctance of state and local gov-
ernments to subject taxpayer-financed projects to claims of liens and
to potential forced sale is understandable; unpaid claimants, however,
still need a remedy.
The stop notice remedy complements the mechanics' lien and
provides a means of surmounting these two limitations on the effec-
tiveness of the lien. A stop notice is written notification to the property
owner or construction lender of the existence of a claim for services
rendered on the project by a subcontractor, materialman, supplier or
laborer against the original (general) contractor or a subcontractor.
When filed according to the statute8 the stop notice obligates the re-
cipient to withhold the amount claimed from any payments subse-
quently made to the original contractor under the construction contract
until the claim is litigated or otherwise settled. The stop notice is,
in effect, a lien on the construction fund up to the amount of the claim,
in contrast to the mechanics' lien which actually gives the lienor a right
in the improvement and the land upon which it sits.
The stop notice remedy alleviates the two limitations of the mech-
anics' lien which were mentioned above. First, on a private job, fore-
closure of a prior deed of trust or mortgage does not affect stop notice
rights.9 Subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers can use
the stop notice to levy against the fund which has been established
to finance a construction project.'" As long as any money remains
in the fund all stop notice claimants are protected to some extent be-
cause even if the amount in the fund is less than the total claimed,
all claimants receive a pro rata share." The second limitation is over-
7. Id. § 3109.
8. See text accompanying notes 51-64 infra.
9. Rossman Mill & Lumber Co. v. Fullerton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 221 Cal. App.
2d 705, 34 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1963); see A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Cal. 2d 728, 394 P.2d 829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1964); Miller
v. Mountain View Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1965).
Of course, if no money remains in the fund, the stop notice is as useless as the wiped
out mechanics' lien.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3161-62 (West Supp. 1974).
11. Id. § 3167.
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come because a stop notice may be filed against a public works con-
struction fund 2 and is the only means subcontractors, suppliers, ma-
terialmen and laborers have to secure their claims for services ren-
dered on the project.
Although stop notices may be filed on both public works projects
and on private construction jobs, recent litigation has concerned only
private stop notices filed against construction lenders.'3 This note
therefore deals solely with the private stop notice and focuses on those
cases in which a construction lender is involved. When the lending
institution deals only with reputable developers and contractors, the
stop notice does not appear to pose a problem.14 The cases which
reach the courts, however, often reveal that the developer or contractor
is undercapitalized, unreliable or incompetent to perform the job at
hand.' 5 In such circumstances the use of stop notices by subcontrac-
tors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers to tie up the construction loan
fund can cripple a project and deprive the construction lender of its
property interest in the loan fund.
The following hypothetical situation illustrates why the private
stop notice is being questioned. A developer wishes to purchase land
and hire a general contractor to build houses on it. In order to finance
the project, he borrows money from a savings and loan association.
The loan is secured by the land and the houses to be built on it.
Pursuant to the loan agreement the borrower assigns the loan proceeds
back to the lender. The lender establishes a construction loan fund
with the loan proceeds and then makes disbursements from the fund
to pay subcontractors, materialmen, suppliers and laborers. Construc-
tion or weather problems delay the project and increase costs. The
developer is undercapitalized and cannot meet both the loan payments
and the rising construction expenses. Those who have performed
work for the developer are not paid because construction costs have
12. Id. § 3181.
13. E.g., Connolly Dev. Inc. v. Superior Court, appeal docketed, No. 5 Civ. 2057,
5th Dist., Cal. CL of App., 1972.
14. Interview with Ms. T.R. Smith, a construction loan officer with Great West-
ern Savings and Loan Association, San Francisco, Dec. 21, 1973. Conversations with
other loan and escrow officers at the Franklin Savings and Loan and Bayview Savings
and Loan Associations, both in San Francisco, substantiated this statement.
15. E.g., Ware Supply Co. v. Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n, 246 Cal. App. 2d
398, 54 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1966) (contractor failed to use loan fund to pay materialman);
H.O. Bragg Roofing, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 226 Cal. App. 2d 24, 37
Cal. Rptr. 755 (1964) (contractor disappeared before construction was completed);
Rossman Mill & Lumber Co. v. Fullerton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 221 Cal. App. 2d 705,
34 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1963) (same). An extreme example of how a developer's under-
capitalization and a contractor's incompetence may combine to produce a disaster is
found in Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609,
73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
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exceeded the developer's budget. At this point the unpaid claimants
file both mechanics' liens and stop notices. The stop notices freeze
the construction loan fund up to the amount claimed and thus the ag-
gregated claims quickly tie up most, if not all, of the loan fund. 6
Assuming that work on the project continues, more and more po-
tential claimants are performing work. Since the previously filed stop
notices have effectively garnished most of the loan fund, these new
claimants are not paid and they also file mechanics' liens and stop
notices. Finally, work on the houses ceases because no one is being
paid. The new houses which were to be sold to provide the developer
with the capital to make his loan payments are not built, and the de-
veloper abandons the project because he cannot possibly make a profit.
Finally, the lender forecloses on its mortgage, pays the stop notice
claimants out of the remainder of the construction loan fund and takes
whatever steps it can to minimize its losses.
The foregoing shows that the exercise of stop notice rights can
cripple a construction project. For that reason this remedy has come
under attack in California courts17 and by commentators' during the
last several years. Only recently has this attack been predicated on
grounds of procedural due process. 19
Although there is a general constitutional requirement of a hear-
ing prior to the deprivation of the use of property,2 ° the private stop
16. See Idaco Lumber Co. v. Northwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 265 Cal. App.
2d 490, 493, 71 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (1968) (nineteen stop notices filed totaling
$62,846.14 with $37,577.31 remaining in the loan fund).
17. A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Cal. 2d
728, 394 P.2d 829, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1964); Miller v. Mountain View Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1965); Rossman Mill & Lumber Co.
v. Fullerton Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 221 Cal. App. 2d 705, 34 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1963).
18. Crocker, Stop Notice Problems of Institutional Lenders, 40 L.A.B. BULL. 323
(1965); Goulden & Dent, More on Mechanics' Liens, Stop Notices and the Like, 54
CAlIF. L. REv. 179 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Goulden & Dent]; Ilyin, Stop Notice!-
Construction Loan Officer's Nightmare, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 187 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Ilyin]; Lubell, Changes in Construction Lenders' Policies-1958-1969, A Lender's
Viewpoint, 44 L.A.B. BULL. 346 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lubell].
19. Connolly Dev. Inc. v. Superior Court, appeal docketed, No. 5 Civ. 2057, 5th
Dist., Cal. Ct. of App., 1972; Miller, Validity of the Stop Notice As a Summary Rem-
edy, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 44 (1973). In another case involving Connolly Development,
Inc., the trial court overruled the defendant's demurrer which contended that the me-
chanics' lien and the stop notice were unconstitutional. The defendant petitioned the
District Court of Appeal for a writ of mandamus and was summarily denied. Connolly
Dev. Inc. v. Superior Court, 1 Civ. No. 34002, 1st Dist., Cal. Ct. of App., Oct. 23,
1973. The California Supreme Court refused a petition for a hearing on the matter.
Connolly Dev. Inc. v. Superior Court, 1 Civ. No. 34002, Dec. 5, 1973. Thus, the
case will proceed at the trial level.
20. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
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notice makes no provision for a hearing on the probable validity of
the claim. The stop notice claimant need only verify"1 and, if serving
it on a construction lender, bond the stop notice.2 2  The lack of a
hearing conflicts with constitutional requirements of due process and,
in the opinion of the writer, renders the private stop notice invalid.
It is believed, however, that the requirement of a hearing can be easily
met by incorporating the summary hearing provided for under the pub-
lic works stop notice statute23 into the private stop notice statute.
The Private Stop Notice
The Mechanics' Lien
On private construction jobs, creditors generally make stop notice
claims in conjunction with exercising their mechanics' liens rights.24
Filing a stop notice claim attaches unexpended construction funds;
25
by constrast, filing a mechanics' lien attaches the work of improvement
and the land upon which it sits. 26  Although related, these remedies
are distinct from one another.
The mechanics' lien is an ancient device by which many legal
systems protect laborers, materialmen and suppliers. Roman law and
early maritime law recognized the lien; civil law provided a mechanics'
lien and gave claims under it preference over all other creditors. But
there was no mechanics' lien under the common law, and therefore
in the United States it is a purely statutory remedy, as is the stop no-
tice.2
California's concern for the "mechanics" class2 8 was evidenced
by an 1850 statute2 9 which antedated the state constitution. The Cali-
fornia Constitution of 1879 offered mechanics special protection by
providing that:
Mechanics, materialmen, artisans, and laborers of every class,
shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have be-
486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464
P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970); McCa~lop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d
122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
21. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3103 (West Supp. 1974).
22. Id. § 3162.
23. Id. §§ 3197-3205.
24. CALFoRNrA MEcHN-ics' LmNs AND OHn RMnDms § 1.82 (Cal. Cont.
Educ. Bar 1972) [hereinafter cited as CEB MEcHAics' LMNS].
25. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3161-62 (West Supp. 1974).
26. Id. § 3128.
27. A brief history of the mechanics' lien is found in M. MARSH, CALFORNIA
MEcHAIcs' LmN LAw HANDBoo 1 (2d ed. D. Ilyin ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MARsH].
28. A mechanic is "A workman employed in shaping and uniting materials, such
as wood, metal, etc., into some kind of structure, machine, or other object, requiring
the use of tools." BLAcKS LAw DICTIONARY (.rev. 4th ed. 1968). As indicated in the
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stowed labor or furnished material for the value of such labor
done and material furnished; and the Legislature shall provide,
by law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens. 30
The current California statute enacted in compliance with that constitu-
tional provision31 is complex, but its basic purpose of providing this
class of creditors with a method of enforcing claims for services ren-
dered in building an improvement has been met. Upon a judgment
by a court that the claim is valid, the land and the improvement which
were attached by filing the mechanics' lien are subjected to a forced
sale and the proceeds are used to satisfy the claim.
The mechanics' lien statute also provides that when a claim is
for labor, services or material furnished to a contractor, the contractor
must defend at his own expense any action brought.3 2  During the
pendency of the action, the owner may withhold from the contractor
the amount of money which is claimed.33  But in contrast to the stop
notice remedy, this is not a lien upon the fund used by the owner
to pay the contractor. Rather, the statute merely enables the owner
to protect his own property from forced sale by making certain that
he has funds to pay the mechanics' lien claimants if they should prevail
at trial.
The California Private Stop Notice
The stop notice is a logical extension of the mechanics' lien, sup-
plements its coverage and does not depend upon the establishment
of a mechanics' lien for its effectiveness. 34  Courts have considered
it to be a lien on the construction fund35 as opposed to a lien on the
land and the improvement built on it.
The California legislature has established two types of stop no-
tices: one for private jobs36 and one for public works or improve-
ment.3 7  In the case of private jobs, the California Civil Code provides
term "mechanics' lien" however, the word "mechanics" is also a generic term which
includes contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers.
29. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 87, §§ 1-14, at 211-13.
30. Art. 20, § 15.
31. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3109-3153 (West Supp. 1974).
32. Id. § 3153.
33. Id.
34. Bates v. Santa Barbara County, 90 Cal. 543, 547, 27 P. 438, 439 (1891).
35. Newport Wharf & Lumber Co. v. Drew, 125 Cal. 585, 589, 58 P. 187, 188
(1899); Bianchi v. Hughes, 124 Cal. 24, 27, 56 P. 610, 612 (1899); McAlpin v. Dun-
can, 16 Cal. 126, 128 (1860); Calhoun v. Huntington Park First Say. & Loan Ass'n,
186 Cal. App. 2d 451, 459, 9 Cal. Rptr. 479, 483 (1960). Many of these decisions
use the word "garnishment" to describe the stop notice and its effect on the construc-
tion fund.
36. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3156-3175 (West Supp. 1974).
37. Id. §§ 3179-3214.
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that subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers, as well as ex-
press trust funds and claimants who have made site improvements, may
use the stop notice to freeze a portion of the construction funds. 88 The
original contractor, however, has no right to use the stop notice statute
against the holder of the construction fund.8 9 Presumably, this result
obtains because privity of contract makes the owner personally liable to
the original contractor.
The stop notice remedy allows a creditor to freeze any unex-
pended construction funds which are held by an owner or lender.
Upon receipt of a properly filed stop notice, the holder of the fund
must withhold from the original contractor an amount sufficient to pay
the claim,40 whether or not the holder actually owes the amount of
the claim to the original contractor at the time the stop notice is
served.
41
Prior to 1951, the private stop notice statute required the owner
to withhold the amount claimed from the original contractor but did
not mention the construction lender.42  The remedy was not used of-
ten on private jobs until the 1951 statute subjected the lender to the
stop notice.43  In that year the California legislature enacted the mod-
em private stop notice statute.44 When the legislature revised the
mechanics' lien law in 1969, it included the stop notice statute. The
new law is merely a reiteration of the 1951 law, however; the drafter's
intent was to rearrange the provisions in a more logical order and to
restate the language of the code sections more clearly.45
Since the early 1960s, subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and
laborers have used the stop notice more frequently on private construc-
tion projects.46  The relative popularity of the stop notice remedy can
be attributed to three factors. First, if the claimant's mechanics' lien
is barred by the lender's foreclosure of a prior deed of trust, his right
38. Id. § 3159.
39. Id. The "original contractor" is "any contractor who has a direct contractual
relationship with the owner." Id. § 3095. An exception is an original contractor who
contracts for a portion of the work. In that case he is treated as a subcontractor and
may file a stop notice against the construction lender only. Id. § 3159. This means
that a contractor specializing in a particular field may protect himself with a stop no-
tice even though he contracts directly with the owner. Miller v. Mountain View Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 238 Cal. App. 2d 644, 655-56, 48 Cal. Rptr. 278, 286 (1965).
40. CAL. Civ. CODE H§ 3161-62 (West Supp. 1974).
41. A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Cal. 2d
728, 733-35, 394 P.2d 829, 834, 40 Cal. Rptr. 85, 89 (1964).
42. Cal. Stat. 1885, ch. 152, § 2, at 145.
43. MARsHr supra note 27, at 146.
44. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1159, § 1, at 2946.
45. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1362, § 10, at 2783. See also MARsH, supra note 27,
at 6-7.
46. See articles cited in note 18 supra.
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against the unexpended construction funds, acquired by filing a stop
notice with the lender, remains intact.47  Second, when claimants use
the stop notice remedy, they are protected by statutory provisions
which require that stop notices take priority over any assignment of
the construction loan fund by the owner or original contractor, whether
or not the stop notice was served on the lender before the assignment
was made.48  Third, if several stop notices are filed and the total
amount claimed exceeds the sum remaining in the construction fund,
all claimants who gain a judgment share in a pro rata distribution of
the fund unaffected by the order in time in which they served their
stop notices on the owner or lender. 49  These three features have
made the stop notice statute an attractive remedy for subcontractors,
suppliers, materialmen and laborers to use to recover money owed
them for performance rendered to a subcontractor or the original con-
tractor on private construction projects; consequently, the stop notice
procedure has generated controversy in the construction industry.50
Even though care must be taken to observe the various filing
deadlines, the stop notice procedure is relatively easy for creditors to
follow. The California Civil Code provides explicit instructions for
preliminary notices, bonded stop notices, the content of stop notices,
the method of service of stop notices and time limits for filing stop
notices and for commencing suit on the claim. These procedures are
discussed below in order to provide a framework for the due process
arguments which follow.
Civil Code section 3097r" requires claimants to give a written
preliminary twenty day notice to the original contractor, owner and
construction lender, if any, prior to the recording of a mechanics' lien
and prior to the filing of a stop notice. Potential claimants must file
this preliminary notice no more than twenty days after initially furnish-
ing labor, service, equipment or materials to the jobsite.52  The failure
to serve a preliminary notice within the first twenty days does not pre-
vent a creditor from serving it later, but a claim which arises more
than twenty days prior to the notice is barred.53 In order to encourage
service of the preliminary twenty day notice, section 3097(h) requires
a licensed subcontractor to give the preliminary notice on any job
where the contract price exceeds $400. Failure to do so constitutes
47. A-1 Door & Materials Co. v. Fresno Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Cal. 2d
728, 394 P.2d 829, 40 CaL Rptr. 85 (1964).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3166 (West Supp. 1974).
49. Id. § 3167.
50. See articles cited in note 18 supra.
51. All references in the text to the "Civil Code" or to "section" numbers are
to CAL. CIv. CODE (West 1954 & Supp. 1974).
52. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 3097(c) (West Supp. 1974).
53. Id. § 3097(d).
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grounds for disciplinary action by the Registrar of Contractors.54 Sec-
tions 3097(c)(1)-(5) prescribe five pieces of information which the
preliminary twenty day notice must contain. These are (1) a descrip-
tion of the labor, equipment, service or materials furnished or to be
furnished, (2) the name and address of the person performing the
work or supplying the materials, equipment or service, (3) the name
of the person who contracted for the work, (4) a description of the
jobsite sufficient for identification, and (5) a statement that if bills
are not paid in full the property may be subject to mechanics' liens.
The foregoing requirements suggest that the purpose of the prelimi-
nary twenty day notice is to give the owner, original contractor and
construction lender advance warning of the existence of potential
claimants under the mechanics' lien and stop notice laws and to enable
them to estimate their possible liability. Although the preliminary no-
tice enables a claimant to file a stop notice at a future date, a lender
need not honor a stop notice unless it is bonded.
Section 3162 states that when a construction lender receives a
bonded stop notice, it must withhold sufficient money to answer the
claim. The bond provision protects against frivolous claims because
the bond must be conditioned to pay costs and damages to the contrac-
tor, owner and lender should the claimant lose his case in court.55
The claimant may also file an unbonded stop notice with the construc-
tion lender; but in that case, the lender is not required to withhhold
the amount claimed, though it may do so if it wishes.56 Under section
3161, a stop notice served on the owner requires him to withhold from
the original contractor the amount claimed; there is no provision for
bonded stop notices served on owners. These two Civil Code sec-
tions57 prescribing the mandatory withholding of money from the origi-
nal contractor make the private stop notice a potent weapon because
the funds frozen by the stop notice are needed to pay for continued
construction. This gives the creditor leverage in reaching an out of
court settlement of his claim and, as seen above, may cripple the pro-
ject." Before a stop notice is effective, however, a claimant must
comply with technical requirements of verification, content, service
and time limits for filing.
Section 3103 provides that a stop notice must be verified by the
claimant and must show the type of work done or agreed to be done,
the name of the person to or for whom the work was done, the value
of the work already done and the value of the whole agreed to be
54. Id. § 3097(h).
55. Id. § 3083.
56. Id. § 3162.
57. Id. § 3161-62.
58. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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done. This helps assure that the claim is at least arguably true and
enables the owner or lender to withhold the proper amount of money
from the original contractor. The same Civil Code section prescribes
methods for service of the stop notice on the owner or construction
lender which are sufficient to give actual notice.59 In accordance with
section 3160, the claimant must serve the stop notice on the owner
or construction lender prior to the expiration of the period for re-
cording his mechanics' lien. 6° Once the claimant has complied with
these provisions, he has effectively garnished the construction fund up
to the amount of his claim without resort to any judicial action. In
order to keep the stop notice in effect, however, the claimant must
bring suit within the proper period of time and must give timely notice
of the commencement of the action to the owner or construction
lender.
Section 3172 allows the claimant to bring an action against the
owner or construction lender to enforce payment of the claim any time
after ten days from the date of service of the stop notice and provides
that no suit may be brought more than ninety days after the expiration
of the period within which mechanics' liens are to be recorded. The
stop notice claimant must give notice of the commencement of the
action to the owner or construction lender within five days of bringing
suit.6 ' The action cannot be brought to trial before ninety days have
elapsed following the expiration of the period within which mechanics'
liens are to be recorded.62  Section 3173 gives the court discretion
to dismiss the action for lack of prosecution if it is not brought to trial
within two years of commencement. The result of these rather loose
time limits is that the amount claimed may be tied up for months or
years. One commentator has noted that attorneys for stop notice
claimants generally wait until the last day of the ninety day period
before filing a complaint for damages.6 3  In the extreme but not un-
usual case where work on the project ceases before completion of the
improvement, the claimant may file his stop notice yet need not com-
59. The stop notice may be served upon the owner, left at his residence or busi-
ness with a person in charge, or delivered to his architect. The construction lender
is served by delivery to the manager or some other responsible person at the branch
administering or holding the loan fund. A stop notice may also be served by certified
or registered mail. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3103 (West Supp. 1974).
60. Mechanics' liens must be recorded by subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen
or laborers within ninety days after they have completed their work, or, within thirty
days after the owner or his agent records a valid notice of cessation of work on the
project (id. § 3092) or a notice of the completion of the project (id. § 3093). Id.
§ 3116.
61. Id. § 3172.
62. Id.
63. Miller, supra note 19, at 107 n.44.
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mence suit for 240 days. 64 There will be further delay, of course,
before going to trial. By filing a stop notice and commencing his ac-
tion, a claimant is able to freeze construction funds in the amount of
his claim for a lengthy period without a hearing.
Protection Against the Private Stop Notice Remedy
There are only two weapons available which enable an owner
or construction lender to counter the use of the private stop notice
remedy: the payment bond and the stop notice release bond. The
owner and the construction lender may protect themselves from stop
notices by requiring the original contractor to file a payment bond in
an amount not less than 50 percent of the contract price. 65 If the
payment bond is recorded prior to the time of the service of a stop
notice, the lender need not withhold the amount claimed under the
stop notice.66 In cases where there is no construction lender and the
payment bond is recorded, the owner may withhold the money claimed
under a stop notice but is not obligated to do so.
67
The second protection available to the owner and construction
lender is the stop notice release bond. This bond may be obtained
by the owner, construction lender or any original contractor or subcon-
tractor and should be filed with the person upon whom the stop notice
was served (that is, either the owner or the construction lender).8
Sufficient sureties must execute the bond in a sum equal to one and
one-fourth times the claim and the bond must be conditioned for pay-
ment of the amount the claimant may recover on his stop notice claim
along with his costs of bringing suit.69  Once the release bond is filed,
the funds withheld from the original contractor pursuant to the stop
notice must be released.
0
64. Id. at 107; see CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 3092-93, 3116, 3172 (West Supp. 1974).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3161-62, 3235 (West Supp. 1974).
66. Id. § 3162.
67. Id. § 3161.
68. Id. § 3171.
69. Id.
70. Id. A comparison of the protections available to the owner or lender against
the private stop notice with those available to the original contractor against the public
works stop notice is enlightening. On a public project the original contractor has two
protections against stop notices: the stop notice release bond and a summary hearing
on the claim.
Civil Code section 3196 makes provision for a stop notice release bond which is
similar to that in a private job except that the public entity which has contracted for
the public work of improvement has discretion to refuse to allow the original contrac-
tor or subcontractor to file the bond. Id. Thus, original contractors who would dis-
pute the stop notice claim and file a release bond are dependent upon a government
official who may not be sensitive or sympathetic to the problems created by the filing
of a stop notice. Many government agencies are reluctant to permit the filing of a
March 19741 PRIVATE STOP NOTICE 1053
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Effects of the Use of the Private Stop Notice Remedy
If the exercise of a claimant's stop notice rights ultimately results
in foreclosure of a prior deed of trust or mortgage by the lender, the
result is clearly unsatisfactory. The developer loses his project and
any chance for a profit while the lender must use all the money re-
maining in the loan fund to pay stop notice claimants their pro rata
share. Thus, many times the lender grants the loan and is confronted
later with an uncompleted project, an exhausted loan fund and the
necessity of completing the project with its own money in an attempt
to reduce its losses.
It is clear, then, that the stop notice shifts the risk of loss from
the unpaid subcontractor or materialman to the construction lender and
owner. This risk factor has caused a "tangible change" in the methods
lenders use to disburse the loan proceeds.71 Lenders have switched
from the "draw plan" to the "voucher system." In the draw plan,
the lender paid the contractor in stated installments (usually five) as
the project reached specified stages of completion. Under the voucher
system the lender pays only those bills which are substantiated by a
voucher which has been signed by the contractor and the person to
whom the money was owed.72  The voucher system has limitations,
however, since vouchers may be padded or improperly drawn to pay
debts in connection with other projects of the original contractor.73
Vouchers compel the lending institution to take a more active role
in the project by more carefully scrutinizing the concept of the project,
the ability and reputation of the developer or original contractor and
the performance of all concerned with the job.74
A Note On Private Stop Notice Statutes In Other States
It may be useful at this point to compare methods used in other
states to give subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers an
release bond. CEB MECHANICS' LIENs, supra note 24, at § 11.16.
Civil Code sections 3197-3205 provide a summary hearing for an original contrac-
tor who disputes the validity of a stop notice claim. See text accompanying note 175
infra for a description of its operation. Only original contractors can use the summary
hearing procedure of the public works stop notice statute; apparently they do not use
it often. CEB MECHANICS' LIENS, supra note 24, at § 11.26.
71. Lubell, supra note 18, at 363.
72. Id. at 365-66; see Goulden & Dent, supra note 18, at 199 n.18.
73. Ware Supply Co. v. Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n, 246 Cal. App. 2d 398,
54 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1966); Goulden & Dent, supra note 18, at 200; flyin, supra note
18, at 194.
74. For an example of the extent of lender participation in a construction project,
see Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (lender liable to purchasers of homes it financed on a theory
of negligence).
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interest in a construction fund. This comparison will show that Cali-
fornia's private stop notice law is broader than the others. The fact
that the private stop notice remedy is limited in other jurisdictions may
account for the lack of objection to the remedy in these other states.75
Five states, not including California, have statutes which provide
claimants with methods of freezing at least part of a construction fund
even though they may not be denominated stop notices.76 The various
types of statutes fit into two broad categories: (a) those which are
available to claimants only if their mechanics' lien rights are foreclosed
for specified reasons; and (b) those which attach only a specified por-
tion of the construction fund.
Colorado, New Jersey and Wisconsin provide the stop notice
remedy when mechanics' lien rights are cut off. In Colorado and New
Jersey an owner may protect his property and the improvement -to
be built on it from forced sale by recording his contract with the orig-
inal contractor at the office of the county recorder. Once the contract
is recorded mechanics' lien rights are foreclosed and the only remedy
for subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers is the stop no-
tice.77  As in California, service of the stop notice on the owner re-
quires him to withhold the amount claimed from the original contrac-
tor.78 In New Jersey stop notice claimants are limited by judicial con-
struction of the statute which establishes the priority of the claims of
laborers and materialmen. The rule is that where there is an unpaid
balance under the owner's contract with the original contractor and
the owner expends his own funds to complete the improvement follow-
ing abandonment of the project by the contractor, the owner prevails
over stop notice claimants. 79  Thus, if the owner has spent more than
the balance due under his contract with the original contractor, stop
notice claimants receive nothing.
In Wisconsin, mechanics' lien rights are not recognized if the orig-
inal contractor, pursuant to his contract with the owner, agrees to pay
any claims for labor performed or material furnished on the project
and secures a bond which will pay such claimants. 0 Once this pay-
ment bond is secured, persons furnishing labor or materials to the orig-
75. Research disclosed no cases in those other states having stop notice statutes
which attack the remedy on due process grounds.
76. The states are Colorado, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Texas and Washington.
77. Great Western Sugar Co. v. F.H. Gilcrest Lumber Co., 25 Colo. App. 1, 136
P. 553 (1913); CoLo. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-1-(3) (Supp. 1969); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2A:44-75 (1952).
78. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86-3-2-(6) (1963); NJ. RaV. STAT. § 2A:44-78
(1952); Bankers Title & Abstract Co. v. Ferber Co., 15 N.J. 433, 105 A.2d 408 (1954).
79. James Falcone Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Pasquale, 26 NJ. Super. 285, 97
A.2d 720 (1953).
80. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 289.03(2) (1973).
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inal contractor or to a subcontractor have a lien on the construction
fund and may notify the owner or construction lender of their claim."'
When the owner or lender receives the notice it must withhold the
amount claimed from the original contractor and failure to do so results
in liability to the claimant for damages caused by such failure. 82
Texas and Washington have statutes which allow claimants to at-
tach a specified portion of the construction fund. In Texas there are
two ways that a claimant can gain a right in the construction fund.
The first is that a laborer or materialman has a lien for "retainage."83
A laborer or materialman may contract with the original contractor or
a subcontractor to have a portion of the contract price withheld even
though the laborer or materialman has completed performance. This
allows the original contractor or a subcontractor to make certain that
the performance was complete and satisfactory. However, the laborer
or materialman has a lien on the amount retained and must notify
the owner of the retainage agreement so that the owner can withhold
from the original contractor the amount agreed to be retained from the
laborer or materialman.84 The second method of giving laborers and
materialmen an interest in the construction fund is the statutory re-
quirement that the owner retain 10 percent of the contract price for
thirty days after completion of the work as a mechanics' fund to secure
claims for work performed by laborers and materialmen.8s
In 1973 the Washington legislature passed a law which obligated
construction lenders to withhold payments from contractors under cer-
tain circumstances.8 6  The new law applies in all construction jobs
where the contractor has not posted a 50 percent payment bond and
where a construction lender is disbursing the construction fund.' 7
Draws against the fund by the original contractor may be made only
after certification by both the original contractor and the owner that
the job has progressed to a certain percentage of completion. 8 A
laborer or materialman not receiving payment must notify the lender
of his claim 9 and the lender must withhold from subsequent draws
by the original contractor a percentage equal to that percentage of
81. Id. § 289.036(1).
82. Id.
83. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5452(g) (Supp. 1974). "Retainage" is de-
fined as "any amount representing any part of the contract payment or payments which
are not required to be paid to the claimant within the month next following each
month in which the labor was performed, or material furnished, or both .
84. Id. art. 5253-2(a).
85. Id. art. 5469.
86. WASH. STAT. 1973, ch. 47, §§ 2-3, at 496.
87. Id. § 2.
88. Id. § 2-(l).
89. Id. §§ 2-(2), (3).
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completion which is attributable to the performance of the claimant. 90
If the lender fails to comply the claimant has priority up to the amount
of his claim, over the mortgage or deed of trust securing the lender. 1
The California private stop notice statute is broader than all of
those statutes just discussed. Unlike Colorado, New Jersey and Wis-
consin, there is no requirement in California that a claimant's right
to a mechanics' lien be foreclosed before he may exercise his stop
notice rights; rather, claimants in this state often use both remedies
together.92 While Texas and Washington restrict a claimant's -right to
the construction fund to a specified portion, a stop notice claimant in
California may freeze the entire fund if his claim is large enough."
Due Process Requirements for Summary
Prejudgment Creditors' Remedies
United States Supreme Court Decisions
A person's right to due process of law before being deprived of
property by a person acting under color of state law is fundamental. 94
Deprivation occurs when a person is denied the use of his property,"5
even where the denial is temporary9" and the owner still has a chance
to recover his property at a later time.9 The guarantee provided by
due process is that before such a deprivation occurs, a property owner
should have notice of the pending action and an opportunity to be
heard on the claim of the person who is attempting to deprive him
of his property.
98
90. Id. § 2-(4).
91. Id. § 2-(6).
92. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
94. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, § 13. The requirement
that the deprivation of property be accomplished by a person acting under color of
state law before these constitutional guarantees of procedural due process come into
play is discussed in the text accompanying notes 145-53 infra. California courts have
found that mere enactment of a statute along with acts by private individuals under
the statute is enough. 'The existence of a statute which encourages an individual to
violate the constitutional rights of another is treated as state action violating that
right." Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service, 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, 261-62, rehearing granted,
Civ. No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1, 1973. But see Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F.
Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972) and note 151 infra.
95. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972).
96. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85 (1972); accord, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
97. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); cf. Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972).
98. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Outside of
the field of creditors' remedies the requirements of notice and an opportunity to be
heard have been applied in a number of different areas. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have confronted the issue of
whether summary prejudgment creditors' remedies, in which the
debtor is given neither notice nor a hearing before being deprived
of his property, comport with the requirements of procedural due proc-
ess. In 1969, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,99 the United
States Supreme Court overturned a Wisconsin wage garnishment stat-
ute which allowed a creditor to have the debtor's wages attached prior
to a hearing. In that case the creditor had brought suit in the state
court and alleged that Mrs. Sniadach owed $420 on a promissory note.
The Wisconisn wage garnishment law effective at that time required
the employer of an alleged debtor to withhold one half of any wages
which it owed to the employee until the court ordered the disburse-
ment of those wages. The creditor proceeded under this statute and
the employer withheld the one half of Mrs. Sniadach's wages which
were still under its control.
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated that the summary
procedure authorized by the Wisconsin statute
may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary
situations. . . . But in the present case no situation requiring
special protection to a state or creditor interest is presented by
the facts; nor is the Wisconsin statute narrowly drawn to meet
any such unusual condition. 100
Therefore, the court held that the garnishment of wages without a
chance to be heard violated due process. 101
The Sniadach opinion left open the question of whether other
prejudgment creditors' remedies were similarly invalid. While Justice
Douglas spoke in terms of "wages" and the "necessities of life," noth-
ing explicitly limited the holding to wage garnishment. Some fed-
eral district courts and state courts questioned whether Sniadach was
proper authority for invalidating other types of creditors' remedies;
several of these courts held that it did not extend that far.'
02
U.S. 645 (1972) (denial of custody of children to unwed father upon death of mother);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of drivers license); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Goldsmith v. United States
Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (denial of application to practice before
the B.T.A.); Ricucci v. United States, 425 F.2d 1252 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Shelton, J., con-
curring) (termination of government employment); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964) (denial of license to operate liquor store); Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (expulsion of student from tax-supported
college).
99. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
100. Id. at 339 (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Amer-
ican Olean Title Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970); Termplan,
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969); cf. Oller v. Bank of America,
342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage
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Fuentes v. Shevin'0° provided greatly needed clarification of the
doctrine enunciated in Sniadach. There, the Supreme Court invali-
dated the claim and delivery statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania.
These statutes allowed a seller retaining a security interest in a chattel
sold on credit to require the sheriff to seize that chattel merely upon
filing with the clerk of the court a bond and a conclusory allegation
that the chattel rightfully belonged to the creditor. The opinion
stated that Sniadach was limited neither to wages'0 4 nor to necessities
and held that notice and an opportunity to be heard were required
before deprivation of property in general.'0 5
California Decisions
Sniadach started a trend in California toward the invalidation
of a broad range of creditors' remedies which involved the summary
prejudgment seizure by creditors or the sheriff of the property of the
alleged debtor. Shortly after the Sniadach decision, the Califorina Su-
preme Court in McCallop v. Carberry04 6 overturned the California
wage garnishment statute even though it, unlike the Wisconsin statute,
required the employer to notify the employee before the garnishment
took effect. The California law also exempted a greater portion of
the debtor's salary for subsistence than the Wisconsin statute did.
In 1971, the state supreme court decided Blair v. Pitchess0 7 in
Co., 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), affd mem., 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972) which upheld a warehousemen's lien on grounds that the
debtor had delivered the property to the warehouse and that the statute provided the
debtor with an opportunity to institute proceedings upon receipt of notice that the ware-
houseman would hold the property until paid. The court distinguished Sniadach be-
cause that case involved the taking of property from the debtor. Here the property
was already in the hands of the warehouseman through voluntary action on the part
of the debtor. To date, California courts have not found this reasoning persuasive.
See text accompanying notes 120-32 infra.
103. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
104. Sniadach did not carve out an exception for wage garnishment "[It is] in
the mainstream of past [due process] cases .... [Though it] emphasized the special
importance of wages... [it] did not convert that emphasis into a new and more lim-
ited constitutional doctrine." Id. at 88-89.
105. "But if the root principle of procedural due process is to be applied with ob-
jectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions [between gradations of the 'importance' or
'necessity' of the property interest]. The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of 'property'
generally." Id. at 90. In a startling display of judicial intransigence, the Arizona Su-
preme Court upheld the validity of the Arizona attachment laws, holding that Fuentes,
a four-to-three decision, would not be allowed to bring "chaos to an important part of
Arizona's commercial and contract law" because it was not a majority decision. Roof-
ing Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Palmer, 108 Ariz. 508, 512, 502 P.2d 1327, 1331 (1972).
106. 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970); accord, Cline v.
Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970).
107. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 CaL Rptr. 42 (1971).
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which the court invalidated the state's claim and delivery statute. That
statute was designed to enable the seller who retained a security inter-
est in personal property sold on credit to recover possession when the
buyer defaulted in his payments. The creditor merely had to file a
complaint, file an affidavit that he was entitled to the property which
the defendant was wrongfully detaining and post a bond for twice the
value of the property. The county sheriff was then authorized to seize
the property. If the property was in a building and the defendant failed
to deliver it to the sheriff after the sheriff had publicly demanded it,
that officer was required to break into the building, recover the article
and turn it over to the creditor pending trial.
The Blair court held the statute to be invalid on two grounds.
First, the court found that the provision requiring the sheriff to enter
a building forcefully violated constitutional standards of search and
seizure because no warrant-and thus no showing of probable cause-
was necessary.' 08 Second, it held that absent extraordinary circum-
stances, a prior hearing was required before property could be seized.
The claim and delivery statute did not provide for a hearing, and
therefore it violated constitutional requirements of procedural due
process. 109
The California Supreme Court's view of Sniadach was explicated
more fully in the important case of Randone v. Appellate Depart-
ment. 10 Under the then-existing California attachment statute,"' a
defendant's property could be attached by the plaintiff in a suit upon a
contract for the direct payment of money. The writ of attachment issued
when the plaintiff filed both a declaration with the clerk of the court
stating that the contract was within the statutory requirements as well as
a bond for one-half of the claimed indebtedness, or one half of the value
of the property sought to be attached. The writ was sent by the court
clerk to the sheriff for levy and after attachment the sheriff retained con-
trol of the property. Various types of property were exempted from the
statute upon a showing by the defendant that the property seized fell
within an exempt category.
A collection agency sued the Randones and it alleged that they
owed $490 to the collection agency as assignee of a debt originally
owed to a law firm. Using the attachment statute, the agency forced
the sheriff to levy upon the Randones' checking account. All of the
money in the account, $176.20, was attached and withheld from them.
The supreme court noted that Sniadach was "not a rivulet of
108. Id. at 272-73, 486 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
109. Id. at 278, 486 P.2d at 1256, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
110. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
924 (1972).
111. CAL. CODE CI. PROC. § 537, subd. 1 (West 1954) (repealed 1972).
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wage garnishment but part of the mainstream of the past procedural
due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court." ' Ac-
cordingly, the California attachment statute was held invalid because
it allowed deprivation of a debtor's property without prior notice or
hearing. The court stated that in order to conform to the requirements
of procedural due process, any California statute which authorized
summary prejudgment seizure had to be narrowly drawn in order to
confine its operation to extraordinary circumstances in which an over-
riding governmental or creditor interest existed.113 The court stated
in dictum that it had no doubt that the legislature could draft a con-
stitutionally valid prejudgment attachment statute if necessities of life
were exempted from its operation. The statute could permit attach-
ment after notice and a hearing on the probable validity of the credi-
tor's claim; further, the court expressed its opinion that in extraordi-
nary situations attachment without a hearing would be constitutionally
permissible.""
The validity of three of California's possessory liens has also been
contested; a Federal District Court decisively invalidated the innkeep-
ers' lien,"r5 while two decisions of the District Courts of Appeal struck
down the bankers' lien 16 and the garagemen's lien." 7 The California
Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal from the decision in the
bankers' lien case," 8 however, and the court which invalidated the
garagemen's lien then agreed to a rehearing of that case," 9 presum-
ably after the supreme court makes its decision. These three opinions
show that a private individual proceeding under a statute which allows
him to seize the property of an alleged debtor must also observe the
due process requirement of a hearing even though the seizure is ac-
complished totally without governmental participation. Even though
the validity of the bankers' lien and the garagemen's lien has not been
finally decided, the liens involved are analogous to the stop notice and
the decisions therefore are an indication of judicial attitudes toward
private prejudgment seizure. This analysis necessarily depends upon
that analogy and must proceed in the face of a possible adverse de-
cision by the California Supreme Court. The most ancient of these
112. 5 Cal. 3d at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
113. Id. at 557, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
114. Id. at 563, 488 P.2d at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
115. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
116. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133, hear-
ing granted, No. S.F. 23014, May 23, 1973.
117. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, rehearing granted, Crv.
No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1, 1973.
118. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133, hear-
ng granted, No. S.F. 23014, May 23, 1973.
119. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, rehearing granted, Civ.
No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1, 1973.
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possessory liens, the innkeepers', was the first to be invalidated.
In Klim v. Jones,' the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of California held the innkeepers' lien to be unconstitutional
because the law failed to provide for a hearing prior to the imposition
of the lien. California Civil Code section 1861 allowed an innkeeper
to enter peaceably into the room of a lodger who owed rent and to
seize any property found there.' Unless the amount claimed was
paid by the lodger within sixty days, the innkeeper could sell the prop-
erty at auction if he gave the debtor at least fifteen days notice of
the sale.'22 If the proceeds from the sale exceeded the amount owed
and the debtor failed to claim the remainder within six months, the
innkeeper was to turn the residue over to the county. The debtor
had one year thereafter to claim the residue before the county be-
came the owner.'2 3  The court objected to the harsh results of the
imposition of the lien, finding that the lien affected people of low in-
come who made their homes in low cost hotels. The lien allowed
the innkeeper to seize nearly all of the property in the room regard-
less of whether it included necessities of life. In Klim, the articles
which the innkeeper seized included house painting equipment which
was the alleged debtor's source of livelihood. The court found that
the power to seize all of the property worked a great hardship on the
alleged debtor'2 4 and that the reasoning of Sniadach compelled the
court to hold that a judicial hearing on the innkeeper's claim was re-
quired before the innkeeper could seize the property. 5
In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2 6 the California District Court
of Appeals invalidated the bankers' lien statute which provided that
"[a] banker has a general lien, dependent on possession, upon all
property in his hands belonging to a customer, for the balance due
him from such customer in the course of business.' 27  The plaintiff
had a checking account with the defendant bank and later acquired
a Master Charge credit card through the same bank. The plaintiff
made purchases on the Master Charge account and became delinquent
in making her payments. The bank therefore seized all of the funds
120. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
121. Only musical instruments which the lodger used to make a living and prosthe-
tic or orthopedic devices belonging to the lodger were exempt. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1861
(West Supp. 1974).
122. Any property seized which did not belong to the alleged debtor was exempt
from sale if any other person gave timely notice to the inkeeper that he claimed the
property. Id.
123. Id.
124. 315 F. Supp. at 123.
125. Id. at 124.
126. 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133, hearing granted, No. S.F. 23014,
May 23, 1973.
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3054 (West 1954).
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in the plaintiff's checking account under authority of the bankers' lien
statute. The court relied on the reasoning in Randone, finding that
the bankers' lien was constitutionally invalid because the statute au-
thorized deprivation of the debtor's property without prior notice or
hearing and without any judicial writ. The statute did not limit sum-
mary seizure to the debtor's nonnecessities of life, nor to extraordinary
circumstances in which there was an overriding governmental or cred-
itor interest.'28
The garagemen's lien fell next in Quebec v. Bud's Auto Ser-
vice.12 9 In that case the California District Court of Appeals found
that Civil Code section 3051, which allowed a garageman to retain
a customer's automobile for nonpayment of a repair bill without notice
to the customer or a hearing on the validity of the garageman's claim,
violated procedural due process and was unconstitutional. The Civil
Code required notice to the customer prior to the sale of his vehicle13"
but the owner was deprived of possession until the bill was settled.
The vehicle owner's only remedies were either to pay the bill or re-
deem the vehicle after sale.' 31 The court relied heavily on the de-
cisions which invalidated the innkeepers' lien (Klim) and the bankers'
lien (Kruger). In dictum, the court stated that since the garagemen's
lien existed at common law and gave the lienor a right of possession
superior to that of the owner of the vehicle, invalidation of the garage-
men's lien would deprive the garageman of his common law right of
possession without a hearing. However, the precedent of Kruger com-
pelled the court to reach a contrary result.'3 2
128. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 205, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
129. 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, rehearing granted, Civ. No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1,
1973.
130. CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 3052, 3072 (West 1954).
131. Id. §§ 3052, 3074 (West Supp. 1974).
132. 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, 261-63 (1973). Sniadach and the cases which followed
generated much commentary. Articles and notes which provide insight into the issues
and problems surrounding the requirement that procedural due process standards be ap-
plied to creditors' remedies include Jackson, Attachment in California-What Now? 3
PAc. L.. 1 (1972); Ordin, Summary Creditor Remedies: A Thing of the Past?, 47
L.A.B. BULL. 230 (1972); Smith, Sniadach & Summary Procedures: The Constitution
Comes to the Marketplace, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 300 (1972); Note, Procedural Due Process
-the Prior Hearing Rule & The Demise of Ex Parte Remedies, 53 B.U.L. REv. 41
(1973); Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
886 (1971); Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 942 (1970);
Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-The Fuentes Case: Sniadach Made Clear, 22
DEPAUL L. REv. 499 (1972); Note, The Demise of Summary Prejudgment Remedies
in California, 23 HASTNGS L.J 489 (1972); Note, Attachment and Garnishment-
Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 986 (1970); Note, Attach-
ment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1254 (1970);
Note, Attachment and Garnishment in California-In Need of Reform, 4 U.C. DAVIS
L. Rav. 57 (1971); Comment, Attachment in California. Another Round of Creditors'
Rights & Debtor Protection, 20 U.C.L.A.L REv. 1015 (1973); Note, The Constitu-
March 19741 PRIVATE STOP NOTICE
Due Process and the Private Stop Notice
The Private Stop Notice and Other Invalid Creditors' Remedies
The private stop notice statute permits the "taking of property"
because a stop notice claimant can deprive the owner and lender of
the use of the sum which he has claimed. California courts have in-
validated various creditors' remedies involving analogous seizures of
property. 133  The traditional creditors' remedies of attachment and
claim and delivery involved the seizure of a debtor's property by the
sheriff upon issuance of a writ by the court; both of these have been
tional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837 (1970).
It might be argued that since the debtors in the invalidated creditors' remedies were
consumers, procedural due process need be applied only when the debtor is a consumer.
However, in People ex rel. Younger v. Allstate Leasing Corp., 24 Cal. App. 3d 973,
101 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1972), the court invalidated CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 537(5)
which authorized prejudgment attachment in an action by the state or a political subdi-
vision for the collection of money due upon legal obligations or penalties owed to the
state or local government. The debtor in this case was a corporation rather than a
consumer and the court concentrated on the fact that the statute did not limit its opera-
tion to specific categories of property owned by the alleged debtor (such as nonnecessi-
ties or real estate) nor to extraordinary circumstances in which summary seizure might
be required. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 975-76, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 471-72.
Further, if the procedural due process guarantees are truly neutral principles of
the law, then a fortiori the status of the alleged debtor must be irrelevant. The prin-
ciple should operate even when debtor and creditor are businessmen dealing at arms
length unless the debtor has voluntarily waived his constitutional right to procedural
due process.
133. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971) (attachment); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr.
42 (1971) (claim and delivery); Cline v. Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125,
83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970) (attachment of wages); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d
903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970) (same); Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv.,
32 Cal. App. 3d 257, rehearing granted, Civ. No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1, 1973 (ga-
ragemen's lien); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr.
133, hearing granted, No. S.F. 23014, May 23, 1973 (bankers' lien); Damazo v. Mac-
Intyre, 26 Cal. App. 3d 18, 102 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972) (unlawful detainer); People
ex rel. Younger v. Allstate Leasing Corp., 24 Cal. App. 3d 973, 101 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1972) (attachment of money due on any obligation or penalty imposed by law); Gray
v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971) (unlawful detainer statute
insofar as it allows a landlord to hold tenant's possessions and provides that the tenant
can redeem only by paying the amount claimed due plus storage costs); Mihans v. Mu-
nicipal Ct., 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970) (immediate dispossession
of tenant's premises upon a showing of his insolvency). See also Hall v. Garson, 468
F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (summary execution by landlord on tenant's possessions);
Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (innkeepers' lien);
Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (landlord's levy on tenant's
possessions); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)
(claim and delivery); Desmond v. Hachey, 315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me. 1970) (imprison-
ment of judgment debtor for failure to obey subpoena); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp.
109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (inkeepers' lien).
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held unconstitutional because the statutes failed to provide a hearing
prior to seizure. 13 4 Even though these statutes required the creditor
to file a declaration with the court that the claim was valid as well
as a bond in the amount claimed or of the value of the property to
be seized, the courts found them to be unconstitutional. 135 Thus, the
requirement that a stop notice be bonded (in the case of a construction
lender) and verified by the claimant should not exempt it from due
process standards. 38
Closer analogies to the seizure of property which occurs under
the stop notice statute are those cases in which the attachment is ef-
fected by the creditor himself without any judicial action; these reme-
dies include the innkeepers' lien,137 the bankers' lien 38 and the gar-
agemen's lien.'3 9 These liens all authorized the creditor to seize the
property of the debtor in the possession of the creditor in order satisfy
the alleged debt. 4 ' The stop notice procedure is analogous because
the holder of the construction fund is obligated by law to withhold
the amount claimed from the original contractor even though no judge
or official scrutinizes the papers, the court issues no writ of attachment,
and no government official seizes the property.' 4 '
The fact that the possessory liens listed above were held invalid
indicates that a private individual proceeding under a staute may be
compelled to observe the due process requirement of a hearing before
seizing the property of the alleged debtor. It should be noted that
the bankers' lien case is before the California Supreme Court at this
time.142 Should the court find that the bankers' lien is constitutional
and that no hearing is necessary prior to seizure, then the decisions
which invalidated the innkeepers' lien and the garagemen's lien must
be suspect. One may then expect the rehearing in Quebec to reverse
the earlier decision, since it apparently rests squarely on Kruger.
43
A reversal of Kruger would not necessarily imply that the stop notice
is valid, however. If the ground for reversal were the common law
origin of the bankers' lien, that should not affect the stop notice be-
134. See text accompanying notes 107-14 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 107-14 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 55-59 supra.
137. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
138. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133, hear-
ing granted, No. S.F. 23014, May 23, 1973.
139. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, rehearing granted, Civ.
No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1, 1973.
140. See text accompanying notes 120-32 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 34-64 supra.
142. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133, hear-
ing granted, No. S.F. 23014, May 23, 1973.
143. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 262-63.
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cause it is a purely statutory remedy with no common law basis;"
and any limitation on the use of the stop notice remedy would not
be in derogation of a common law right.
The Requirement of State Action
The United States and California constitutional guarantees of no-
tice and a hearing before a person is deprived of his property operate
only when state action causes the deprivation.14 5 Therefore, the pri-
vate stop notice statute is invalid only if the acts of stop notice claim-
ants under that law can be found to be tantamount to state actions.
This threshold question so necessary to the invocation of these due
process guarantees has received scant attention from California courts
in cases where the creditor proceeds against the debtor under a statute
but without any judicial or other official state action.14 6 The court
which invalidated the garagemen's lien in Quebec v. Bud's Auto Ser-
vice"' faced the issue squarely and stated that the existence of a state
statute which encouraged an individual to violate the constitutional
rights of another would be treated as state action violating that right.' 8
The court cited the case of Reitman v. Mulky'49 as authority for this
conclusion.
In Reitman the United States Supreme Court invalidated a pro-
vision of the California Constitution which allowed property owners
to refuse to rent or sell their residential property for any reason. The
Court held that the provision violated the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it encouraged and involved the state in racial discrimination by
establishing a method of racial discrimination under a state law."' ° It
144. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
145. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941), rehearing denied, 314
U.S. 707 (1942); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); see Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 32 Cal. App. 3d 257,
261, rehearing granted, Civ. No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1, 1973; Beck v. Ransome-
Crummey Co., 42 Cal. App. 674, 678, 184 P. 431, 433 (1919). California courts have
held the scope and purpose of the due process clause of the California Constitution
(art. 1, § 13) to be identical with that of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. E.g., Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 20, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904, 914
(1971).
146. See, e.g., Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr.
133 (1973) (bankers' lien). See also Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (innkeepers' lien). The operation of these statutes is described in the text ac-
companying notes 120-32 supra. There is no doubt of state involvement in the cases
of attachment and claim and delivery since a clerk of the court issues the writ of at-
tachment and the sheriff actually seizes the property. See text accompanying notes
107-14 supra.
147. 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, rehearing granted, Civ. No. 41502, 2d Dist., June 1,
1973.
148. Id. at 261-62.
149. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
150. Id. at 381.
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is arguable that the holding in Reitman is limited to its facts and that
in the absence of racial discrimination the acts of an individual who
proceeds under a state statute do not, without more governmental in-
volvement, constitute state action.151
Thus, the conclusion of the court in Quebec, that the mere exist-
ence of a statute which encourages private individuals to violate the
constitutional rights of others will be treated as state action violating
that right, is open to question. The problem may soon be solved
in regard to statutes providing such creditors' remedies as the private
stop notice, the garagemen's lien and the innkeepers' lien when the
California Supreme Court decides the validity of the bankers' lien in
the case of Kruger v. Wells Fdrgo Bank.152 As previously discussed,
the bankers' lien statute allowed an individual to seize the money of
a debtor in its possession and is indistinguishable in effect from the
innkeepers' and garagemen's liens. :5 3  The private stop notice is
analogous because it authorizes a private individual to file the notice with
the holder of the construction fund and thus freeze a portion of the
fund without any judicial or other governmental action. The private
stop notice differs from the liens mentioned above only because the
construction fund is not in the possession of the stop notice claimant,
151. See Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In
that case the court was asked to rule on the validity of California's Commercial Code
provisions allowing a secured creditor to repossess an automobile. The court found
that the bank was not a state agency, that no state official carried out the repossession
and that the repossession was carried out under a contractual right which had been
judicially approved prior to the adoption of the UCC. It therefore held that the act
of repossession was not an action under color of state law sufficient to entitle the
debtor to constitutional rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
taking of the vehicle. It is interesting to note that the court distinguished the invalida-
tion of the innkeepers' lien in Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). It
said that the requirement of state action in cases where a private individual is acting
under statutory authority can be met only in -rare cases, including those in which the
power exercised was purely statutory as distinguished from being of common law or
contractual origin. 342 F. Supp. at 23. Yet, the innkeepers' lien is of common law
origin. 315 F. Supp. at 119-20. The inclusion of the innkeepers' lien as authority for
the proposition that the origin of an act as common law or contractual is determina-
tive of whether the act constitutes state action thus defeats rather than supports the
court's reasoning. Further, if the distinction between purely statutory rights and those
of common law or contractual origin is significant, the stop notice may be distinguished
because the stop notice remedy is based solely on statute. See also Shelton v. General
Elect. Credit Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F.
Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb.
1972); Greene v. First Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Mc-
Cormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
152. 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133, hearing granted, No. S.F. 23014,
May 23, 1973.
153. See text accompanying notes 120-32 supra.
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whereas the property seized under the invalidated liens was in the
possession of the creditor at the time of the seizure. It is not believed,
however, that this difference is significant; if the California Supreme
Court upholds the bankers' lien on the ground that a proceeding under
it does not constitute state action, the private stop notice statute would
apparently be immune from attacks based on procedural due process.
If the supreme court reached such a conclusion one could infer that
perhaps the court felt as a matter of policy that creditors eligible to
use this type of private action statute needed security for their debts
more than debtors needed protection from such creditors. A narrow
reading of the holding in Reitman would provide the rationale neces-
sary to put that policy in effect.
Taking Property
There can be no doubt that the owner or construction lender is
deprived of the use of at least part of the construction fund when a
stop notice claimant freezes an amount in the fund equal to his claim;
property is effectively attached after a claimant properly serves a stop
notice. The resultant freezing of the construction fund is a deprivation
of the use of property even though the owner later has a chance to
recover the funds if the stop notice claimant does not prevail at trial.
154
The owner thus has a property interest in the money he will use to
pay the original contractor when there is no lender involved. The fact
that there may have been no fund specifically established to pay the
original contractor does not change the effect of the stop notice claim
because no matter what the source of the money is, the owner is pre-
vented by law from paying the amount claimed to the original contrac-
tor.15 5 This deprives the owner of the use of his property without
a prior hearing on the validity of the stop notice claim.
When a construction lender is holding the loan proceeds and dis-
bursing them to the original contractor pursuant to a loan agreement,
the owner (who is, of course, the borrower) still has a property inter-
est in the construction loan fund since he is personally liable to the
lender. The borrower has a contractual right which guarantees him
that the loan proceeds will be distributed properly to the original con-
tractor, and thus the lender has a duty to do so. Further, the borrower
has a property interest in the land and the improvement to be con-
structed on it which serve as security for the loan. The borrower has
delegated control over the construction loan fund to the lender but
has not given up his property interest in it. The position of the con-
struction lender with respect to the loan proceeds is comparable to
that of the borrower.
154. See text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3161 (West Supp. 1974).
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The lender has a property interest in the construction loan pro-
ceeds in much the same way that the seller of a chattel on credit has
an interest in the thing sold if he reserves a security interest in it.
The lender has acquired the right to make payments out of the fund
by contract with the borrower. Service of a stop notice deprives the
lender of the use of its property by restricting its control over payouts
from the loan fund up to the amount of the claim.156
Having previously discussed the way in which the use of the stop
notice remedy can sometimes cripple a construction project, 157 it is
not inaccurate to say that an owner's or lender's property interest in
the construction fund is significant and not de minimis. Therefore,
the procedure used to enforce a private stop notice claim should com-
port with due process guidelines;' s that is, the legislature should re-
quire that a judge provide a hearing before the money must be with-
held unless extraordinary circumstances exist which justify a summary
taking of the property.' 59
Extraordinary Circumstances
What constitutes an extraordinary situation sufficient to authorize
the summary prejudgment seizure of property without a hearing has
received some judicial attention. In Sniadach,60 the Court cited these
examples: Federal Drug Administration regulations which allow sum-
mary seizure of misbranded articles which are fraudulent or dangerous
to health,' 61 the immediate governmental replacement of a bank's
156. Id. § 3162. It has been argued in the case of a construction loan that the
fund is held in trust for the benefit of those contributing to the work of improvement.
Since the fund is administered by the lender, it is said, and since the owner cannot
interfere with its disbursement, the owner has no interest in the fund other than the
expectation that it will be used to pay the valid costs of construction and thus the
stop notice remedy does not constitute a taking of the owner's property. Moss, The
Stop Notice Remedy in California-Updated, 47 L.A.B. BULL. 299, 301-02 (1972).
This appears to be an understatement of the owner's interest, as indicated in the text.
It ignores those cases where there is no loan and assumes that all stop notice claimants
submit valid claims. It does not acknowledge that a prejudgment summary taking is
invalid even though the claimant is sure to prevail ultimately. Coe v. Armour Ferti-
lizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915). Finally, it is inaccurate to state that the own-
er's interest in the fund is a mere expectancy. See text accompanying notes 155-56
supra.
157. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
158. "Since this deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis, [petitioner]
must be accorded the usual prerequisites of procedural due process: notice and a prior
hearing." Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
159. See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
160. 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
161. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
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management when failure is imminent' 62 and the attachment of the
property of a nonresident defendant. 163  California courts have found
that a defendant's nonresidency is an extraordinary circumstance which
allows prejudgment attachment of his property without a hearing"'
and that a statute authorizing immediate recovery from a criminal de-
fendant of public funds used in a narcotics investigation to purchase
drugs did not violate due process. 165 Thus, courts have so far recog-
nized three general types of extraordinary circumstances: when the
public is in great physical or financial danger, when there is a signifi-
cant risk that a criminal defendant will abscond, and when a civil de-
fendant will escape the effects of a potential adverse judgment unless
his property is seized immediately.
The stop notice remedy serves two major interests of creditors.
First, it gives mechanics a priority lien on the construction fund and
thus shifts the risk of loss to the owner or lending institution. 66 Sec-
ond, it gives leverage to creditors and presumably encourages more
rapid settlement of claims. The question is whether these two inter-
ests are of such overriding importance to justify the taking of property
without a hearing.
Invalidation of the stop notice remedy would simply shift the risk
of loss back to subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers.
They would be forced to rely on the mechanics' lien statute to secure
their claims for services rendered to the original contractor and they
would also have a cause of action against the original contractor on
their contract. In addition the Civil Code provides protection for these
creditors through payment bonds,' 67 so that if an original contractor
secures this bond the former stop notice claimants are paid up to
the amount of the bond. Thus in the absence of the stop notice rem-
edy subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers have adequate
protection.
The fact that most states have no stop notice remedy, and that
those which do provide it limit its effectiveness,'168 indicates that there
is no danger to the public or to creditors sufficient to justify the sum-
mary taking of property which occurs when a stop notice claimant
freezes money in a construction fund. In any event, the imposition
162. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. Co. v. Bennett, 227
U.S. 29 (1928).
163. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
164. Banks v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 143, 102 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1972); Lef-
ton v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 100 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1972); Ortleb v. Super-
ior Ct., 23 Cal. App. 3d 424, 100 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1972); Property Research Financial
Corp. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
165. Damazo v. MacIntyre, 26 Cal. App. 3d 18, 102 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972).
166. See text accompanying notes 9, 70-71 supra.
167. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3235-41 (West Supp. 1974).
168. See text accompanying notes 75-91 supra.
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of a prior hearing on the stop notice procedure would merely delay
the withholding of the amount claimed; it would not destroy the rem-
edy.
The Due Process Requirement of a Hearing
The fact that the owner and lender have four methods of protect-
ing themselves from private stop notices does not obviate the need
to make the procedure measure up to standards of due process. The
statutory provisions for payment bonds, stop notice release bonds,
bonded stop notices and preliminary twenty day notices are not ade-
quate substitutes for a hearing. The owner or lender may require
the contractor to file a payment bond but this is unsatisfactory because
all contractors cannot obtain such bonds.169 The stop notice release
bond, like the release bonds in other invalidated attachment schemes,
should have no effect on the requirement of a hearing. Y7 While the
bonded stop notice1 71 offers some protection to the lender, other cred-
itors' remedies have contained similar provisions and courts have found
that they did not fulfill the due process requirement of a hearing. 72
The preliminary twenty day notice merely warns of potential liability 17
and does not give the owner or lender a chance to be heard on the
claim.
The owner or lender may require potential stop notice claimants
to sign lien releases as prerequisites to payment, but the claimant may
refuse to sign. A voucher system of payment may provide some assur-
ance that subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers will be
paid, though it is not foolproof. In any event, lien releases and voucher
systems do not meet the due process hearing requirement.'
7 4
169. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
171. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 107-14, 135 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
174. The notion that the due process difficulty might be solved if the owner or
lender were to waive his constitutional right to a hearing before the stop notice be-
comes effective is not realistic. The United States Supreme Court has held that a cor-
poration, in an arms length transaction, might waive its rights to prejudgment notice
and hearing and allow a creditor to obtain a judgment on a note based on the advance
consent of the debtor corporation. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972). The waiver of due process rights which is essential to this cognovit procedure
might be applicable in other commercial settings, but does not lend itself to transactions
in which private stop notices might be filed.
The owner or construction lender would be the party required to waive his right
to a prejudgment hearing, but there is no contractual relationship between that party
and the subcontractor, materialman, supplier or laborer who would be the stop notice
claimant. Overmyer cannot be read as approving implied waiver of due process rights,
so in the absence of a contractual relationship such a waiver is impossible. Further,
economic realities militate against any contractual waiver, particularly where a con-
struction lender is involved. The lender is in a much better bargaining position than
potential stop notice claimants; it is difficult to picture the lender sumitting to a waiver
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Curing the Constitutional Defects in the Private Stop Notice Statute
If the California legislature would require a hearing to establish
the probable validity of a creditor's claim before a private stop notice
takes effect, then the present stop notice statute would meet due proc-
ess requirements. The hearing could be patterned after that provided
for under the public works stop notice statute.'7 5
The proposed procedure would allow an original contractor,
owner, or lender who disputed the stop notice claim to serve an affi-
davit on the claimant. The affidavit should allege the legal grounds
upon which the stop notice is invalid and the facts which support these
grounds. The statute should give the stop notice claimant twenty days
to reply with a counteraffidavit. In the meantime, the owner or lender
should not be made to withhold the amount claimed. The counteraffi-
davit should allege the details of the stop notice claim and set forth
in detail the specific basis upon which the claimant contests or rebuts
the allegations of the affidavit. If the stop notice claimant does not
reply with a counteraffidavit within the stated time, his claim should
be barred.
Once the counteraffidavit is served upon the owner or lender,
either they or the stop notice claimant would be able to file an action
in superior court for a declaration of the respective rights of the par-
ties. After the action is filed, either party could move for a hearing
by the court for the purpose of determining his rights under the affi-
davit and the counteraffidavit. The court should grant the motion for
a hearing within fifteen days unless circumstances dictate that it be
continued. The affidavit and the counteraffidavit should constitute the
pleadings although the court might permit amendment in the interests
of justice. No findings should be required in the hearing; the court
might make its determination solely on the affidavit and the counter-
affidavit or could order the hearing continued for the production of
oral or documentary evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing the
court should make its order determining whether or not the claimant
has the right to have the money withheld pursuant to its stop notice.
The only questions before the court in the hearing would be (1)
whether the claim is of a type included under the stop notice statute,
(2) whether the claimant is entitled to stop notice rights, (3) whether
the amount of the claim is excessive, and (4) whether there is any
basis in law for the claim as set out in the stop notice. Any findings
clause in the loan agreement, say, with potential stop notice claimants made the bene-
ficiaries of the clause. Rather, the lender holds the upper hand in drafting the loan
agreement and is able to insert terms in its favor. In addition, the waiver process
typically works in the opposite direction; before paying potential stop notice claimants
out of the construction loan fund, the lender often requires them to sign waivers re-
leasing their mechanics' lien and stop notice rights. See articles cited in note 18 supra.
175. See note 23 supra.
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on these issues would not reach the merits of the claim itself, so deter-
minations in the hearing would not be res judicata in regard to any
right of action by the claimant against the principal or surety on a
labor and material bond or against any party personally liable to the
claimant. The hearing proposed herd would determine merely the
probable validity of the claim and thus would lend itself to rapid dis-
position.
In the interim between the filing of the stop notice and the hear-
ing the claimant should be able to compel the lender or owner to pay
costs of construction only upon properly authenticated vouchers. This
would not eliminate all of the claimant's risk that the construction fund
would be depleted prior to the hearing, but it would allow the work
to proceed and other potential claimants to be paid until the hearing
occurs. If work proceeded, the claimant's mechanics' lien would have
a greater chance of realization than if the construction fund were even-
tually depleted. This is because the improvement becomes more val-
uable as it nears completion and thus on its forced sale it would com-
mand a higher price. If a construction lender were involved, there
would be less chance of the lender's foreclosure of the mortgage and
a consequent termination of mechanics' lien rights because as long as
the work was proceeding there would most likely be no violation of
the loan agreement. Furthermore, the original contractor, owner, or
lender might not dispute the stop notice claim and instead waive the
hearing. Waiver of the hearing would indicate that the owner or
lender was willing to pay and thus facilitate settlement of the claim.
It is possible, but not very probable, that under such a procedural
scheme the fund would be depleted before the hearing and that the
stop notice claimant's mechanics' lien would be cut off by the lender's
foreclosure of the mortgage. But the state constitution does not re-
quire that subcontractors, suppliers, materialmen and laborers be in-
sured against loss.' 7 6  By requiring a hearing, the standards of due




The private stop notice is a creditors' remedy allowing prejudg-
ment attachment of property without a hearing. This violates the re-
176. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
177. 'The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending
upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceed-
ings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). "The nature and form of
such prior hearings . . . are legitimately open to many . ..- variations and are a subject
.. . for legislation-not adjudication. ... [It is axiomatic that the hearing must
provide a real test." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972). Thus, the hearing
proposed here is sufficient to meet due process standards because necessities of life are
not involved and a full trial on the claim is available after the hearing.
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quirement of procedural due process that a hearing must precede the
taking of any significant property interest. Only the extraordinary cir-
cumstance of an overriding public or creditor interest will justify sum-
mary deprivation of property. Any statute permitting such a remedy
should be tightly drawn to restrict its operation to those special situa-
tions.
No state or creditor interest is sufficient to justify the summary
deprivation of property which occurs under the present private stop
notice law. This note therefore has recommended procedures which
comply with due process and which are still fair to subcontractors, sup-
pliers, materialmen and laborers.
Ronald W. Nelson*
* Member, Second Year Class
Author's Note: On April 10, 1974, the California Supreme Court invalidated the
garagemen's lien in a unanimous decision. Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
SAC 7959, April 10, 1974. The court held that the garageman might retain possession
of the automobile when the owner refused to pay for repairs, but that the garageman
could no longer sell the car to satisfy his claim. Justice Clark, writing for the court,
found the garageman's act of retaining the car under the lien statute to be under color
of state law. He made a similar finding with respect to the sale of the automobile
because the sale was authorized by statute and administered by the California De-
partment of Motor Vehicles. However, the court held that the retention of the auto-
mobile was not a violation of due process because the garageman also had a possessory
interest in the car after he had put time and expense into its repair. The sale of the
vehicle without a hearing was a permanent deprivation of the owner's property by
the state and therefore was a violation of due process.
In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, S.F. No. 23014, April 26, 1974, the California
Supreme Court held that a bank's setoff of charge account debts against a depositor's
checking account constituted private action, not state action. Justice Tobriner, writing
for a unanimous court, found that the case raised no issue of the constitutionality of
the banker's lien statute (see text accompanying notes 126-28) because the bank
actually asserted its right of setoff against the depositor's account rather than a lien
upon the account. The court said that California Code of Civil Procedure section 440,
which authorized the setoff, "merely codified the right of setoff as it existed in courts
of equity" and that the court could not find that the section was designed to, or did
in fact, encourage banks to exercise their right to setoff without notice to the debtor.
Consequently, the court could not base a finding of state action on the reasoning of Reit-
man. (See text accompanying notes 145-53) The court also found that since the
bank would have a right of setoff in the absence of the statute, the statute did not
create a private right of summary seizure and therefore the existence of the code
section could not raise a bank's conduct under it to the level of state action.
One might infer that, given the proper case, the court would strike down a statute
which created a private right to summary seizure. The holding in Adams that the
garageman's possession of the vehicle under the statute constituted state action, although
it did not violate due process because the garageman had a possessory right in the
automobile, strengthens this impression. The two threads are tied together in the
private stop notice remedy: the statute created a purely statutory right of private seizure
and the creditor has no right of possession in the construction fund. It is submitted
that both Adams and Kruger supports the thesis of this note that the private stop
notice statute is unconstitutional.
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